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THE HIGH COST OF EFFICIENCY:




Linda Willis was an employee at Dean Witter for over six years.1
During her last two years at the company, however, she found the
work environment to be "hostile and demeaning to all female em-
ployees," and contends that she "was discharged and/or forced by
[Dean Witter] to resign her employment.., because of her sex." 2
Although Miss Willis' situation appears characteristic of most sex-
ual harassment and gender discrimination claims, she did not find
herself in the shoes of a typical claimant. As a registered member
of the securities industry, she signed a pre-dispute mandatory arbi-
tration contract as a condition of her employment. As such, her
claim was never presented to a jury of her peers, but rather to what
was likely a homogenous panel of white males in their sixties.3 Re-
portedly, and not surprisingly, "women have not fared well" before
such panels.4
The above scenario reflects what has become standard practice
in the securities industry. Anyone seeking a license to buy or sell
securities must sign a Form U-4, formally known as the Uniform
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 1999. B.A., English, Col-
lege of the Holy Cross, 1996. The author would like to thank Isaac Greaney for his
insightful suggestions and critiques throughout the drafting of this Note. The author
also wishes to extend her utmost gratitude to her parents, Jack and Maryann Sullivan,
for their steadfast love, support and encouragement.
1. See Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991).
2. Id. at 306 (citing J. App. at 9-10).
3. See Judith P. Vladeck, Validity of ADR for Job Disputes: 'Yellow Dog Con-
tracts' Revisited, N.Y. L.J., July 24, 1995, at 7, col. 2 ("The panels of the New York
Stock Exchange or the NASD are composed, almost exclusively, of men who are
older than sixty. In fact, almost ninety percent of the 3,000 arbitrators used by those
agencies are male."); see also Roland Jones, To Arbitrate or Litigate? Employees May
Fare Better in Court, But Arbitration May Prove to be the Better Forum As Panels
Become More Diversified, ON WAIL ST., Oct. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8814281
("A 1994 U.S. General Accounting Office study of NASD and NYSE arbitrators
showed that 89 percent of arbitration panel members are male, 97 percent are white,
and a panelist's average age is sixty . . . ."). "If I were picking a jury for a federal
court, not one person from these arbitration panels would be on that jury." Id. (quot-
ing New York securities lawyer, Jeffrey Liddle).
4. Vladeck, supra note 3.
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Application for Securities Industry Registration or Transfer.' The
Form U-4 includes an agreement mandating that all employment-
related disputes, including federal statutory claims of sexual harass-
ment and racial discrimination, be resolved through arbitration.6
In signing the mandatory arbitration contract, employees within
the industry are denied court-provided rights such as due process,
trial by jury, the appeals process and full discovery. 7 "In essence,
mandatory arbitration contracts reduce civil rights protections to
the status of the company car: a perk which can be denied at will." 8
Employers and their attorneys proclaim that because mandatory
arbitration saves time and money by dispensing with the complexi-
ties and burdens of litigation, such as pretrial motions and discov-
ery, it ultimately benefits both the employer and employee. 9 Other
proponents of mandatory arbitration cite freedom of contract prin-
ciples as a rationale, 10 while still others praise it for its ability to
foster cooperation and maintain work relationships.1' Critics, how-
5. The Form U-4 is used by the American Stock Exchange, the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers ("NASD") and the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE")
for the registration of individuals dealing in securities. See Willis, 948 F.2d at 306; see
also Patrick McGeehan & Deborah Lohse, NASD May Vote Today to Halt Mandated
Harassment Arbitration, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 1997, at B2; Christopher E. Bush,
Supreme Court Tackles Sexual Harassment, A Big Settlement on Wall Street;
Mandatory Arbitration at Issue, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 1998, at 1; Kenneth R.
Davis, The Arbitration Claws: Unconscionability in the Securities Industry, 78 B.U. L.
REV. 255, 291 (1998) [hereinafter Davis, The Arbitration Claws].
6. The arbitration clause in relevant part provides: "I agree to arbitrate any dis-
pute, claim or controversy that may arise between me and my firm, or any other
person, that is required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions, or by-laws of
the organizations with which I register." Willis, 948 F.2d at 306 (quoting Securities
Registration Form U-4 (in effect October 1982)); see also Deborah Lohse, NASD
Votes to End Arbitration Rule in Cases of Bias, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 1997, at B14;
Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 190 (D. Mass.
1998).
7. See Statement by Rep. Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.) before the Senate Bank-
ing Committee on Mandatory Arbitration in the Securities Industry (July 31, 1998),
Mandatory Arbitration in Securities Industry [hereinafter Markey]; see also Davis, The
Arbitration Claws, supra note 5 (noting that "[t]he industry-wide use of Form U-4
makes it even more coercive than most contracts of adhesion, which, although offered
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, are not universally required").
8. Markey, supra note 7.
9. See David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Em-
ployee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L.
REV. 33, 60 (1997).
10. See Miriam A. Cherry, Not-So-Arbitrary Arbitration: Using Title VII Disparate
Impact Analysis to Invalidate Employment Contracts That Discriminate, 21 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 267, 278 (1998).
11. See Kenneth R. Davis, A Model for Arbitration Law: Autonomy, Cooperation
and Curtailment of State Power, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 168-69 (1999) [hereinafter
Davis, A Model for Arbitration] (describing how "arbitration uniquely promotes two
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ever, including the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC"), National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People ("NAACP") and National Organization for Women
("NOW"), are deeply disturbed by the fact that arbitration statisti-
cally favors the employer and tends to result in outcomes that fall
short of the remedies prescribed under federal civil rights law.12
Opponents further contend that mandatory arbitration is intrinsi-
cally unfair and blatantly violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 ("Title VII") because of its disparate impact on women and
people of color.' 3
Despite the onslaught of criticism and heated debate sparked by
mandatory arbitration contracts and clauses, they remain boiler-
plate provisions of employment applications within the industry.
In addition, they are rapidly becoming the norm in similar areas of
the economy, such as Fortune 500 companies and financial services,
as well as other areas such as health care, engineering and informa-
tion technology.14 The securities industry, however, is unique in its
requirement that an employee commit to the arbitration of all em-
ployment-related disputes as a term and condition of employ-
ment.15 Moreover, because this practice is nearly industry-wide, if
one wishes to work in the securities industry, he or she has no
choice but to acquiesce to mandatory arbitration.' 6
The U.S. Supreme Court's 1991 ruling in Gilmer v. Interstate!
Johnson Lane Corp. 17 likely accelerated the expansion of this prac-
tice. The Court held that a mandatory arbitration clause in a stock-
broker's New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") registration
seemingly incompatible values: individual autonomy and cooperation"); Christine
Lepera, What the Business Lawyer Needs to Know About ADR, 578 PLI/LIT 709, 725-
26 (Jan. 1998).
12. See Pete Bucci, Pre-Employment Waivers Favored By Businesses, But Backlash
May Be Brewing, CAP. DIST. Bus. REV., Aug. 18, 1997, at 15.
13. See Cherry, supra note 10, at 299.
14. See id. at 269; see also Bucci, supra note 12, at 15 (noting that recent news
reports have revealed that "last year 300 companies moved into mandatory arbitra-
tion, which breaks down to a rate of twelve to fifteen per month"); Markey, supra
note 7; Rebecca Ganzel, Second-class Justice? (binding arbitration agreements as alter-
native dispute resolution tools), TRAINING, Oct. 1, 1997, at 84 (noting that "[a] recent
survey by the Society for Human Resource Management found that nearly one in
seven respondents worked in companies that 'always' or 'sometimes' used ADR to
resolve employment-related conflicts").
15. See Statement by Russell Feingold (D-Wis.) before the Committee on Bank-
ing, Housing and Urban Affairs (July 31, 1998), Mandatory Arbitration in Securities
Industry, reprinted in 98 CONG. TEST. [hereinafter Feingold].
16. See id.
17. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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application constituted an exclusive remedy with respect to age dis-
crimination claims.18 Additionally, despite the EEOC's adamant
opposition to mandatory arbitration, 9 a majority of lower courts
not only has followed Gilmer with respect to age discrimination
claims, but also has extended Gilmer to statutory claims under Title
VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").2 0 More-
over, courts have applied the ruling to plaintiffs outside of the se-
curities industry.2 ' In fact, until very recently, courts have almost
"universally" enforced mandatory arbitration contracts and
clauses.22
Over the past year, a number of high profile cases within the
industry have brought the inequities of mandatory arbitration to
the nation's attention. 3 In response, members of the SEC and
18. See id.
19. See Josh Lubin, The Legality of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Individual
Employment Contracts, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1031, 1037 (1996-97). The EEOC has
raised four primary concerns regarding mandatory arbitration of statutory claims as a
condition of employment: "(1) arbitration is not subject to the requirements of Title
VII; (2) arbitrators have no training and possess no expertise in employment law; (3)
arbitrators routinely deny plaintiffs punitive damages and attorney's fees; and (4)
some plaintiffs have to pay large arbitration costs." Id.
20. See infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
21. See Leslie Kaufman & Anne Underwood, Sign or Hit the Street: Want a Job?
More and More Employers Require Workers to Agree Not to Take Them to Court,
NEWSWEEK, June 30, 1997, at 48 (reporting on the recent trend among companies
such as JCPenny, Renaissance and ITT Hotels, Great Western Mortgage and Hooters
of America to make pre-dispute arbitration agreements a condition of employment).
22. Cherry, supra note 10, at 271.
23. See Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 190
(D. Mass. 1998) (stockbroker sued her former employer and former supervisor for
age and gender discrimination and sexual harassment under the ADEA and Title
VII). The plaintiff, Rosenberg, "alleged that when she came looking for a document,
one of her supervisors handed her a phallus-shaped vibrator. Six weeks later, the
same supervisor told Rosenberg that her performance was below par and suggested
she resign." Sheldon Goldfarb et al., Securities Industry Must Prepare for Arbitra-
tion's End, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 1998, at 30; see also infra notes 198-204 and
accompanying text (discussing outcome of the case at trial).
Salomon Smith Barney also gained notoriety when twenty-five former and current
brokers sued the firm, alleging that they were routinely subjected to discrimination
and sexual harassment by male co-workers. See Edward Iwata, Huge Sexual Harass-
ment Suit Hits Wall Street Firm - Pioneer Class Action Cites "Locker Room" Atmos-
phere Coast-to-Coast, S.F. EXAMINER, Oct. 18, 1996, at Al; John Schmeltzer, Smith
Barney Settles with Female Brokers, 20,000 May Benefit From Uncapped Fund, CHI.
TRIB., Nov. 18, 1997, at 1 (noting how the women described a "fraternity-like atmos-
phere in most of Smith Barney's more than 390 offices around the country"). "Their
complaints charged the company with allowing operation of 'Boom Boom Rooms'
where male employees were served Bloody Marys while they joked about sexual har-
assment complaints; of managers offering women $100 to strip; and of allowing man-
agers to routinely eliminate jobs of women while they were on maternity leave."
Schmeltzer, supra. The firm ultimately agreed to spend fifteen million dollars on di-
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Congress have expressed doubts as to whether mandatory arbitra-
tion of statutory claims is appropriate in cases of employment dis-
crimination, z4 and one circuit has taken steps to rectify what it
perceives to be a gross injustice. In addition, the SEC recently
approved a proposed rule change by the National Association of
Securities Dealers ("NASD"), which abandons mandatory arbitra-
tion of sexual harassment and racial discrimination claims, thereby
granting employees in the securities industry the option of taking
their complaints to court.26 Nonetheless, brokerage houses across
the country already have voiced their refusal to compromise. 7 In
versity programs, fund a study of the recruitment and utilization of women in the
securities industry and allow sexual harassment plaintiffs to use outside referees. See
Andrew Fraser, Smith Barney 'Boom-Boom Room' Settlement May Sink Mandatory
Arbitration, HARRISBURG PATRIOT & EVENING NEWS (PA.), Nov. 18, 1997, at B7.
The brokerage house also promised to ensure that at least 33% of its broker training
programs are comprised of women for the next three years, as well as fill 15% of its
openings for assistant branch managers and 10% of its branch manager openings with
women. See id. (noting that this move will reportedly double the number of women in
these positions); see also Smith Barney Breaks With Wall Street in Settling Harassment
Case, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 1997, at C12; Patrick McGeehan, Smith Barney Diversity
Plan Represents a Major Leap for Women on Wall Street, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 1997,
at B2.
Despite making such concessions, however, the firm refuses to grant employees the
choice of whether to take complaints to court or to a private forum. See Salomon
Smith Barney Updates Non-Compete, Arbitration Agreement, REG. REP., April 30,
1998 (noting how Salomon Smith Barney was the first major firm to draft a private
pre-dispute arbitration agreement in anticipation of the NASD's move to exclude civil
rights claims from mandatory arbitration). Consequently, some industry experts have
dismissed the settlement as "a public relations coup for Smith Barney because it
would end an embarrassing chapter for the firm and could end up being less damaging
- and costly - than a court fight." Fraser, supra. Other experts, however, have
claimed that the decision to permit claims to be heard by an outside arbitrator could
"undermine arguments by the industry that there is nothing wrong with the current
system." Id. There certainly appears to be merit in this opinion, given that the settle-
ment is coming from one of the largest brokerage firms on the Street.
24. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Sex and the Securities Industry, N.Y. L.J., May 29, 1997,
at 5.
25. See, e.g., Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998)
(holding the Form U-4 to be unenforceable in the context of a Title VII claim on the
grounds that it violated the 1991 Civil Rights Act); see also infra notes 178-93, 206-207
and accompanying text (describing the Ninth Circuit's recent rulings).
26. See SEC Ends Forced Arbitration of Discrimination, Harassment Claims, REG.
REP., Aug. 30, 1998, available in 1998 WL 11871106 [hereinafter SEC Ends Forced
Arbitration]; Rosalyn Retkwa, Forced Arbitration Under Attack, REG. REP., August
30, 1998, available in 1998 WL 11871100. See also infra notes 110-121 and accompany-
ing text.
27. Smith Barney, in anticipation of the NASD's and NYSE's exclusion of statu-
tory civil rights claims from mandatory arbitration, issued an employee handbook
asking employees to sign an agreement to arbitrate all disputes. See SEC Ends Forced
Arbitration of Discrimination, supra note 26; Solomon Smith Barney Updates Non-
Compete Arbitration Agreement, REG. REP., Apr. 30, 1998; see also supra note 23. St.
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fact, as soon as rumors of the rule change began to spread, broker-
dealers adamantly proclaimed their intent to preserve mandatory
arbitration agreements by instituting private pre-dispute contracts
as conditions of employment.28 It thus follows that with the
Supreme Court remaining silent on the issue, and Gilmer the final
word, the industry will continue to routinely engage in this practice
that so many have characterized as unfair and prejudicial.
This Note focuses on mandatory arbitration within the securities
industry and argues that the practice fails to comport with the cur-
rent status of our nation's sexual harassment and civil rights laws
by creating a disparate impact on and undermining the statutory
rights of women and minorities. Part I traces the development of
pre-dispute mandatory arbitration contracts and examines recent
resistance to their application in the context of civil rights. Part II
evaluates the pros and cons of mandatory arbitration, and reviews
the current discrepancy in the circuit courts with respect to the en-
forcement of mandatory arbitration contracts in employment dis-
crimination cases. Part III scrutinizes the enforcement of
mandatory arbitration contracts and clauses for federal statutory
claims of racial discrimination and sexual harassment in light of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 and provides a feminist perspective, con-
tending that mandatory arbitration is detrimental to women and
people of color. Part III ultimately argues that the efficiency argu-
ments supporting mandatory arbitration are outweighed by the in-
equities and prejudice which result. This Note concludes by
advocating the need for reform within the securities industry,
which can best be achieved by instituting a voluntary system with
better internal monitoring and quality control procedures.
I. The Legal Development of Pre-Dispute Mandatory
Arbitration Contracts and Clauses in the Securities Industry
A. The Federal Arbitration Act's Influential Role
Prior to the 1990s, the majority of courts viewed pre-dispute
mandatory arbitration contracts as unenforceable in the context of
Louis-based A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. also has expressed its intent to hold employ-
ees to previously signed agreements to arbitrate all job disputes. See Patrick
McGeehan, PaineWebber to Permit Suits on Harassment, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 1998, at
C1 (noting, however, that both Merrill Lynch and PaineWebber have agreed to adopt
the rule change and allow employees the choice of taking their complaints to arbitra-
tion or suing in court).
28. See McGeehan & Lohse, supra note 5; Markey, supra note 7.
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statutory employment claims.2 9 In 1925, however, Congress paved
the way for the institution and enforcement of mandatory arbitra-
tion contracts by enacting the United States Arbitration Act,
known today as the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). 30 The pur-
pose of the FAA, which provided for the enforcement of valid,
written arbitration clauses involving commercial transactions,31 was
to "reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agree-
ments that had existed at English common law and had been
adopted by American courts, and to place arbitration agreements
upon the same footing as other contracts. ' 32 Section 2, the primary
substantive portion of the Act, states:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or contract evi-
dencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitra-
tion a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract.33
The FAA allows for a stay of proceedings in federal district court
"when an issue in the proceeding is referable to arbitration," as
well as "for orders compelling arbitration when one party has
failed, neglected, or refused to comply with an arbitration
agreement. 34
Since its enactment, the FAA has been broadly interpreted as
expressly favoring arbitration.35 In fact, it seems to be the strong-
est legal argument for enforcing pre-dispute arbitration contracts
and clauses. Additionally, in light of the FAA's enactment, the
U.S. Supreme Court has held that "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a stat-
utory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded
by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral,
rather than a judicial, forum. ' 36 The Court has expansively read
29. See Cherry, supra note 10, at 271.
30. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1994); see also Bucci, supra note 12.
31. See generally 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
32. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24 (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S.
213, 219-20 and n.6 (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 n.4
(1974)).
33. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24-25 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2).
34. Id. at 25 (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4).
35. See id. at 26 ("It is by now clear that statutory claims may be the subject of an
arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the FAA."); see also Michael Delikat,
The Siege Continues: Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Claims, 86 PLI/LIT 483
(June 1998).
36. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
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Section 2 of the FAA to "reach the limits of Congress' commerce
clause power so that states may not apply anti-arbitration laws or
policies. '37 Moreover, "[t]he Court has repeatedly held that any
state anti-arbitration law will be preempted by the FAA and arbi-





The enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration agreements was
first addressed by the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co. 39 The plaintiff alleged that he had been terminated on
the basis of his race, in violation of Title VII.40 His discrimination
complaint was subject to arbitration pursuant to a collective-bar-
gaining agreement ("CBA"), under which the company retained
"the right to hire, suspend or discharge (employees) for proper
cause. '"41 The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that employ-
ees under a CBA are free to litigate statutory claims under the
equal employment opportunity provisions of the Civil Rights Act
in federal court.42 The Court's rationale was that an employee's
contractual rights under a CBA are distinct from the employee's
statutory rights under the equal opportunity provisions of the Civil
Rights Act.43 The Court reasoned that by submitting a grievance
to arbitration, an employee seeks to resolve a contractual right pro-
37. Peter Panken et al., Avoiding Employment Litigation: Alternative Dispute Res-
olution of Employment Disputes in the 90s, SC31 ALI-ABA, Dec. 4, 1997, at 1.
38. Id.
39. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
40. Following his discharge, Alexander, an African-American, filed a grievance
pursuant to an arbitration clause contained in the union's collective bargaining agree-
ment ("CBA"). The grievance stated: "I feel I have been unjustly discharged and ask
that I be reinstated with full seniority and pay." Id. at 39. After the company rejected
Alexander's claim of discrimination, the grievance proceeded to arbitration, where
the arbitrator found in favor of the employer. See id. at 42-43. Alexander then filed
suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1994)
("Title VII"). See id. at 43. The district court granted summary judgment for the
company, holding that Alexander, "having voluntarily elected to pursue his grievance
to final arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of the collective bargaining
agreement, was bound by the arbitral decision and thereby precluded from suing his
employer under Title VII." Id. at 43. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
affirmed. See 346 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Colo. 1971); 466 F.2d 1209 (10th Cir. 1972).
41. Id.
42. See id. at 59-60.
43. See id. at 51.
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vided by the CBA.44 However, in filing a lawsuit under Title VII,
the employee is asserting "independent statutory rights accorded
by Congress."45 As such, "no inconsistency results from permitting
both rights to be enforced in their respectively appropriate
forums." 46
In response to the argument that allowing an employee to insti-
tute a Title VII lawsuit subsequent to arbitration would be unfair
to the employer, the Court reasoned that "[ain employer does not
have 'two strings to his bow' with respect to an arbitral decision for
the simple reason that Title VII does not provide employers with a
cause of action against employees."47 Accordingly, the Court con-
cluded that "the federal policy favoring arbitration disputes and
the federal policy against discriminatory employment practices can
best be accommodated by permitting an employee to pursue fully
both his remedy under the grievance-arbitration clause of a CBA
and his cause of action under Title VII. ' '48
Perhaps more significantly, the Court maintained that although
Congress created the EEOC to procure and promote the Act's
purposes, "final responsibility for the enforcement of Title VII is
vested with federal courts. ' 49 The Court reasoned that courts re-
tain "broad remedial powers" regardless of "a Commission finding
of no reasonable cause to believe that the Act has been violated."50
The Court further held that private individuals have been granted a
significant role in the process of enforcing Title VII as well.51 Ad-
ditionally, the Court construed the Act's legislative history to indi-
44. See id. at 49.
45. Id. at 49-50.
46. Id. at 50 (noting that "[t]he distinctly separate nature of these contractual and
statutory rights is not vitiated merely because both were violated as a result of the
same factual occurrence").
47. Id. at 54.
48. Id. at 59. "Arbitral procedures, while well suited to the resolution of contrac-
tual disputes, make arbitration a comparatively inappropriate forum for the final res-
olution of rights created by Title VII." Id. at 56. The Court supported this contention
on the following grounds: (1) the role of the arbitrator is to "effectuate the intent of
the parties rather than the requirements of enacted legislation"; (2) "the specialized
competence of arbitrators pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the
land"; and (3) "the factfinding process in arbitration is not equivalent to judicial
factfinding." Id. at 56-58.
49. Id. at 44 ("The Act authorizes courts to issue injunctive relief and to order
such affirmative action as may be appropriate to remedy the effects of unlawful em-
ployment practices." (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f), (g) (1970 ed., Supp. II))).
50. Id.
51. See id. at 45 ("Individual grievants usually initiate the Commission's investiga-
tory and conciliatory procedures. And although the 1972 amendment to Title VII
empowers the Commission to bring its own actions, the private right of action remains
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cate "a congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue
independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable
state and federal statutes. '5 2 In support of this interpretation the
Court noted:
The clear inference is that Title VII was designed to supplement
rather than supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to
employment discrimination. In sum, Title VII's purposes and
procedures strongly suggest that an individual does not forfeit
his private cause of action if he first pursues his grievances to
final arbitration under the non-discrimination clause of a
CBA.53
Overall, Gardner-Denver manifests a strong aversion to compel-
ling mandatory arbitration of Title VII claims. The Court reiter-
ated this notion in later cases when finding that no agreement to
arbitrate could bar a civil rights plaintiff from going to court.54 In
fact, for nearly twenty years, courts continued to interpret Gard-
ner-Denver as permitting employees with valid arbitration agree-
ments to bring independent statutory claims against their
employers both with respect to CBAs and individual employment
disputes.5
an essential means of obtaining judicial enforcement of Title VII." (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. II))).
52. Id. at 48 (citing further support in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title VII,
which "have long evinced a general intent to accord parallel or overlapping remedies
against discrimination").
53. Id. at 48-49.
54. See, e.g., Barrantine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (ex-
tending the Gardner-Denver analysis to a claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act);
McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (applying Gardner-Denver to a
police officer's federal civil rights action, despite the fact that he had already arbi-
trated the claim pursuant to the terms of a CBA).
55. See, e.g., Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir.
1988) (holding that an employee's discrimination claims against her employer under
Title VII and the Minnesota Human Rights Act were not subject to compulsory arbi-
tration). "The court pointed out that cases where the FAA preempted state and fed-
eral remedies did not involve employment discrimination claims." Justin M. Dean,
Note, Going, Going, Almost Gone: The Loss of Employees' Rights to Bring Statutory
Discrimination Claims in Court, 63 Mo. L. REV. 801, 809 (1998). Moreover, the court
reasoned that the involvement of a CBA in Gardner-Denver was not a dispositive
factor and the holding instead rested upon "the unique nature of Title VII" and the
fact that "'Congress indicated that it considered the policy against discrimination to
be of the highest priority."' Id. at 809-10 (quoting Swenson, 858 F.2d at 1306 (citing
Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 47)); see also Rosenfeld v. Dep't. of Army, 769 F.2d 237
(4th Cir. 1985); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1990);
EEOC v. Children's Hosp. Medical Ctr., 719 F.2d 1426 (9th Cir. 1983).
320
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2. The Mitsubishi Trilogy
Only a decade after Gardner-Denver, however, the Court ren-
dered a series of decisions that stand in striking contrast to the pre-
sumption against the enforcement of mandatory arbitration
contracts with respect to business-related statutory claims arising in
non-civil rights contexts. 6 In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 57 the Court held that an antitrust dispute
was subject to arbitration pursuant to the FAA's "liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements."58 Recognizing its depar-
ture from "judicial suspicion" of arbitration,59 the Court enunci-
ated a new standard for addressing agreements to arbitrate
statutory claims: "[h]aving made the bargain to arbitrate, the party
should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention
to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at
issue."60
In Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,61 the Court ex-
tended its holding to complaints under the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO").62 In addition, the
Court articulated that in order to circumvent an agreement to arbi-
trate the party opposing arbitration has the burden of showing
"that Congress intended to preclude a waiver. "63 Finally, in Rodri-
guez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,64 the final case
in this "trilogy," the Court enforced an agreement to arbitrate a
statutory claim under the Securities Exchange Act of 1933.65
56. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Rodri-
guez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (collectively
"the Mitsubishi Trilogy").
57. 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (concerning dispute between Japanese automobile manu-
facturer and a distributorship in Puerto Rico under the Sherman Act).
58. Id. at 625. The Court noted that absent fraud or other extreme grounds for
revocation of a contract to arbitrate, "the Act itself provides no basis for disfavoring
agreements to arbitrate statutory claims by skewing the otherwise hospitable inquiry
into arbitration." Id. at 627.
59. Id. at 627.
60. Id. at 628.
61. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 227.
64. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
65. See id. at 485. By handing down such a ruling the Court effectively overruled
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (finding an agreement to arbitrate future contro-
versies, made prior to the existence of the controversy, void under Section 14 of the
Securities Act). See id.
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Accordingly, the Mitsubishi trilogy established that statutory
claims were arbitrable where the parties had entered into an agree-
ment mandating arbitration, and thus stands as a reversal of Gard-
ner-Denver's stance against the enforcement of pre-dispute
mandatory arbitration contracts and clauses.
3. The Gilmer Decision
In 1991, the Supreme Court took the next logical step in the
mandatory arbitration analysis and allowed for the arbitration of
statutory employment-related complaints in Gilmer v. Interstate!
Johnson Lane Corp.66 Gilmer involved a discrimination claim
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). 67
The plaintiff, a registered securities representative, had signed, as a
condition of his employment, a pre-dispute arbitration clause
which contained an agreement to arbitrate "any dispute, claim or
controversy" in accordance with NYSE rules. 68
Upholding the arbitration clause, the Court stated that "[i]t is by
now clear that statutory claims may be the subject of an arbitration
agreement, enforceable pursuant to the FAA. '69 The Court ex-
plained that "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party
does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only
submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, fo-
rum." 70 In addition, the Court noted that while all statutory claims
may not be appropriate for arbitration, the ADEA should be sub-
jected to the analysis set forth in Mitsubishi: compel arbitration un-
less the plaintiff can show a Congressional intent "to preclude a
waiver of a judicial forum for ADEA claims."' 71 Should such Con-
gressional intent exist, the Court observed that "it will be discover-
able in the text of the ADEA, its legislative history, or an 'inherent
conflict' between arbitration and the ADEA's underlying
purposes. "72
66. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). Gilmer claimed that his termination, at the age of sixty-
two, was in violation of the ADEA.
67. Id. at 23.
68. Id. "Of relevance to this case, NYSE Rule 347 provides for arbitration of
'[a]ny controversy between a registered representative and any member or member
organization rising out of employment of such registered representative."' Id. (quot-
ing App. To Brief for Respondent 1).
69. Id. at 26.
70. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628).
71. Id.
72. Id.
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Gilmer, conceding that nothing in the text or legislative history
of the ADEA "explicitly precludes arbitration, '73 resorted to the
general argument that compulsory arbitration of ADEA claims
was inconsistent with the Act's "statutory framework and pur-
poses."'74  Gilmer couched support for this contention on four
grounds, which mirror much of the Court's own analysis in Gard-
ner-Denver. First, Gilmer claimed that arbitration panels would be
biased.75 The Court responded that the danger was minimal in
light of the fact that the applicable NYSE arbitration rules already
offer protections against potentially biased arbitrators.76 Next, Gil-
mer argued that arbitration's limited discovery would thwart a suc-
cessful showing of discrimination.77 The Court, however, found the
discovery provisions contained in the agreement to be more than
adequate when compared to other claims the Court had rendered
arbitrable, such as RICO and antitrust claims.7" In response to Gil-
mer's third concern that public awareness of an employer's prac-
tices would be compromised by an arbitrators' option not to reduce
their decisions to writing, the Court simply noted that the applica-
ble rules required a written arbitration award and public disclosure
of award decisions.7 9 Finally, the Court rejected Gilmer's argu-
ment that arbitration precluded broad equitable relief and class ac-
tion suits on the grounds that all forms of relief were provided for
under the arbitration agreement.8 °
The Court likewise found no merit in Gilmer's additional argu-
ment that mandatory arbitration undermined the role of the
EEOC.81 The Court asserted that "[a]n individual ADEA claim-
73. Id.
74. Id. at 27.
75. See id. at 30.
76. See id. ("The rules require, for example, that the parties be informed of the
employment histories of the arbitrators, and that they be allowed to make further
inquiries into the arbitrator's backgrounds. In addition, each party is allowed one
peremptory challenge and unlimited challenges for cause.").
77. See id. at 31.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 31-32 ("The NYSE rules.., require that all arbitration awards be in
writing, and that the awards contain the names of the parties, a summary of the issues
in controversy, and a description of the award issued.").
80. See id. at 32 (noting that "arbitrators do have the power to fashion equitable
relief"). The Court also pointed out that "even if the arbitration could not go forward
as a class action or class relief could not be granted by the arbitrator, the fact that the
[ADEA] provides for the possibility of bringing a collective action does not mean that
individual attempts at conciliation were intended to be barred." Id. (quoting Nichol-
son v. CPC Int'l Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 241 (3rd Cir. 1989) (Becker, J., dissenting).
81. See id. at 28 ("Indeed, Gilmer files a charge with the EEOC in this case.").
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ant subject to an arbitration agreement will still be free to file a
charge with the EEOC, even though the claimant is not able to
institute a private judicial action. ' 82 The Court further maintained
that "nothing in the ADEA indicated that Congress intended that
the EEOC be involved in all employment disputes," contending
that such disputes have the potential to be settled fully and compe-
tently without EEOC involvement.83 Moreover, the Court deemed
the fact that an administrative agency, such as the EEOC, was in-
volved in the enforcement an insufficient ground for precluding
arbitration.84
Notably, however, the Court did not expressly overrule the
Gardner-Denver decision, but rather distinguished it from Gilmer
on three specific grounds.85 First, in response to Gilmer's vigorous
contention that the Court's decision in Gardner-Denver precludes
arbitration of employment discrimination claims, the Court noted
that the Gardner-Denver decision and its progeny did not involve
the question of whether to enforce agreements to arbitrate statu-
tory claims.86 Instead, "they involved the quite different issue
whether arbitration of contract-based claims precluded subsequent
judicial resolution of statutory claims."87 Second, the Court argued
that the Gardner-Denver line of cases occurred in the context of
CBAs, where the individual statutory rights of claimants were jeop-
ardized by the fact that they were represented by their unions in
the arbitration proceedings.88 The Court noted that this tension
between collective representation and individual statutory rights,
which is inevitable in the case of a CBA, was irrelevant in Gilmer.8 9
Finally, the Court explained that the Gardner-Denver line of cases
was not decided under the FAA, which has since been interpreted
to reflect a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agree-
ments." 90
82. Id. (stating that "the EEOC's role in combating age discrimination is not de-
pendent on the filing of a charge" and it has independent authority to institute its own
investigation (citing 29 CFR §§ 1626.4, 1626.13 (1990))).
83. Id.
84. See id. at 28-29 (arguing that "the Securities Exchange Commission is heavily
involved in the enforcement of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities
Act of 1933, but we have held that claims under both of these statutes may be subject
to compulsory arbitration").





90. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 625).
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Concluding that Gilmer had failed to show that Congress in-
tended to preclude arbitration of claims under the ADEA,91 the
Court established precedent for the enforcement of mandatory ar-
bitration contracts concerning age discrimination claims. In open-
ing this door, however, the Court failed to indicate exactly where
the line was to be drawn. For instance, the Court failed to address
whether Gilmer's holding was limited to the securities industry and
the ADEA, or whether it could be extended to other federal statu-
tory claims and licensing agreements in other industries. 92 Further-
more, by distinguishing Gardner-Denver, as opposed to overruling
it, the Court left open the question of whether arbitration agree-
ments made through CBAs can prevent an employee from litigat-
ing a statutory claim. As such, the lower courts have been left with
little guidance with respect to the mandatory arbitration of sexual
harassment or racial discrimination complaints. Consequently, the
Gilmer decision has resulted in a great deal of confusion regarding
the scope of enforcement of mandatory arbitration contracts within
the securities industry and beyond.
C. The Growing Backlash Against a Broad Application of
Mandatory Arbitration
Despite the fact that Gilmer left issues unresolved, hundreds of
cases involving a wide range of discrimination claims, such as Title
VII,93 the ADA,94 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA") 95 and the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"),
have followed its holding.96 Gilmer even has been extended to
cases outside the realm of the securities industry,97 including em-
91. See id.
92. See Dean, supra note 55.
93. See, e.g., Bendei v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991);
Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991); Alford v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991); Pitter v. Prudential Life Ins. Co.,
906 F. Supp. 130 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (Title VII & Section 1981).
94. See, e.g., Satarino v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 609 (N.D. Tex.
1996) (ADA & FMLA).
95. See, e.g., Ahing v. Lehman Bros. Inc., No. 94 Civ. 9027, 1997 WL 634290
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 1997); Matthews v. Rollins Hudig Hall Co., 72 F.3d 50 (7th Cir.
1995).
96. See, e.g., O'Neil v. Hilton Head Hospital, 115 F.3d 272 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding
that FMLA claims were arbitrable under an arbitration clause in an employee hand-
book where employee had signed acknowledgment and agreement to submit disputes
to arbitration).
97. See supra notes 14, 21.
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ployment contracts, employee handbooks and employment
applications.98
More recently, however, there has been a "minority backlash"
against Gilmer, prompted by a growing concern "about the fairness
of requiring employees to waive certain statutory rights to judicial
review and jury verdicts." 99 Some courts have taken steps to nar-
row Gilmer's holding, 100 while still others have rendered it entirely
void on the grounds that it undermines statutory rights and violates
the Civil Rights Act of 1991.11 Moreover, members of Congress,
the EEOC and SEC commissioners have publicly criticized the
practice.1 °2 In fact, legislation to preclude the mandatory arbitra-
tion of employment disputes already has been introduced. 10 3 The
proposed Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act "would amend
civil rights statutes and the Federal Arbitration Act expressly to
prevent pre-dispute arbitration agreements from being
enforced."' 4
98. See generally Dean, supra note 55 (citing Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992)).
99. Lepera, supra note 11, at 724.
100. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 812 (1995) (holding that an employee cannot be forced to arbitrate
discrimination claims unless he or she knowingly agreed to submit such disputes to
arbitration); Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper, 119 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 1997) (ex-
tending Lai's knowing requirement for Title VII claims to claims under the ADA);
Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1484-87 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (enunciating
the need for several protections against the risk of arbitrators systematically favoring
employers because employers are the source of future business, including: subjecting
arbitration to the scrutiny of plaintiff's lawyers or agencies such as the AAA in order
to ensure neutral arbitrators; greater discovery; increased judicial review of arbitral
judgments; following precedent; adhering to professional and ethical standards; and
requiring the employer to bear the cost of the arbitrator's fee); Halligan v. Piper Jaf-
fray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 203-204 (2d Cir. 1998) (emphasizing the necessity of employ-
ing procedural safeguards to the arbitration of discrimination cases, in holding an
arbitrator's decision in favor of the employer, despite overwhelming evidence to the
contrary, to be in "manifest disregard" of the law).
101. See, e.g., Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998)
(refusing to enforce the Securities Registration Form U-4 in the context of a Title VII
claim on the grounds that it violated the 1991 Civil Rights Act); see infra notes 176-
208 (discussing the discrepancy among federal circuit courts with respect to the inter-
pretation and application of Gilmer).
102. See Coffee, supra note 24 ("The issue in their minds is not whether pre-dispute
mandatory arbitration agreements can cover discrimination cases ... , but whether an
industry is entitled to impose acceptance of arbitration as a condition of employment,
and, most importantly, to do so by governmental action.").
103. See Joshua M. Javits & Francis T. Coleman, High Court to Revisit Issue of
Mandatory Arbitration, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 5, 1998, at B5.
104. Id. (noting that the EEOC has also "adopted a policy supporting voluntary
arbitration of employment disputes but opposing mandatory arbitration of employ-
ment disputes as a condition of initial or continued employment").
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1. Congressional Intent Adverse to Broad Application
In 1991, the same year Gilmer was decided, Congress expressly
created a right to a trial by jury for all employees when it voted by
an overwhelming majority to amend Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.105 The goals of the Civil Rights'and Women's Equity
in Employment Act of 1991 ("1991 CRA") 116 were twofold: (1) to
increase the remedies available to plaintiffs under Title VII so as to
ensure full compensation for all injuries caused by discrimination;
and (2) to make enforcement of the Act more effective through
substantive and procedural amendments that would make it easier
to bring, as well as prove, discrimination suits. 10 7 Moreover, there
was an underlying belief that the enforcement of civil rights would
benefit the entire nation.10 8 "And that public goal of eradicating
discrimination was primarily to be achieved through private litiga-
tion."1"9 In addition to express Congressional goals, the text and
legislative history of the 1991 CRA reveal an intent to preclude
mandatory arbitration contracts under Title VII.
2. NASD's Proposed Rule Change
The backlash against a broad use of mandatory arbitration also
surfaced in the securities industry. The NASD proposed a rule
change in August of 1997 that would eliminate the mandatory arbi-
tration clause from its licensing agreement.110 The proposed rule
grants employees the choice between entering into an individual
agreement with their employer or filing a statutory discrimination
claim with the courts.1 ' In advancing the change, the NASD
promised that "enhanced disclosure would be made to industry
employees to make it clear to them that they have a choice as to
whether to give up their rights to go to court.' 1 12 The proposal
provoked a hostile response from the Securities Industry Associa-
tion ("SIA"). 113 For instance, Stuart Kaswell, the SIA's senior vice
105. See Rosenberg, 995 F. Supp. at 200.
106. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1998)).
107. See Rosenberg, 995 F. Supp. at 200.
108. See id.
109. Id.
110. See Lohse, supra note 6.
111. See generally id.; see also NASD Proposes More Changes to Arbitrate Discrimi-
nation Rules, SEC. WK., Oct. 12, 1998, at 1 [hereinafter NASD Proposes].
112. SEC Ends Forced Arbitration, supra note 26 (noting that "[t]he wording of
those disclosures has yet to be released").
113. See Jones, supra note 3.
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president and general counsel, proclaimed that the SIA considers
arbitration to be "the best mechanism for resolving disputes relat-
ing to the business of the securities industry," and added that em-
ployees who allege workplace discrimination "fare better before
arbitration panels than before juries. ' 114 Kaswell further noted
that discrimination claims are not only more quickly resolved by
arbitration, but arbitration ensures that claims will actually be
heard and not dismissed on pre-trial motions. 115
Despite the SIA's outcries, negative publicity emanating from
discrimination suits against Merrill Lynch & Co. and Travelers
Group Inc.'s Smith Barney, the two largest brokerage firms in the
United States, fueled the urgent need to reform arbitration in the
industry.116 Consequently, the SEC approved the NASD's pro-
posed rule change on June 23, 1998, which exempted discrimina-
tion and sexual harassment complaints from the NASD's
mandatory arbitration requirement of the U-4 statement." 7 At a
September board meeting, the NYSE joined in the movement to
drop the mandatory arbitration of discrimination claims. 1 8 The
new rule took effect January 1, 1999.119 The rule allows all persons
registered with the NASD under the U-4 to assert their right to
have any claims of sexual harassment or racial discrimination
presented to a court of law.120 All other types of claims, however,
remain subject to mandatory arbitration.'12
114. Id. (quoting Stuart Kaswell, SIA senior vice president).
115. See Panken et al., supra note 37.
116. See supra note 23; see also Lohse, supra note 6.
117. SEC Ends Forced Arbitration, supra note 26.
118. See Corporate Update, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 17, 1998, at 1; see also NYSE Plan to
Ban Mandatory Arbitration May Still Leave the Door Open, WALL ST. LETTER, Sept.
14, 1998 (noting that the NYSE made headlines in refusing to honor any form of
mandatory arbitration, including private firm contracts). Under pressure from the
Congress, civil rights groups and various feminist organizations, the SEC persuaded
the NASD to follow in the NYSE's footsteps and cease serving as a forum for the
mandatory arbitration of discrimination claims. See National Association of Securities
Dealers, WALL ST. LETTER, Jan. 4, 1998; Richard Karp, Dueling for Dollars: If the
Bear Returns, Wall Street's Arbitration Wars Will Escalate, BARRON'S, Nov. 16, 1998,
at 24 (noting that the NASD's move "sets a precedent that the members of the claim-
ants' bar might use in trying to end the mandatory securities arbitration rules").
119. See NASD Proposes, supra note 111.
120. See Feingold, supra note 15.
121. See SEC Ends Forced Arbitration, supra note 26; NASD Proposes, supra note
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II. Does Mandatory Arbitration Have a Place
in Civil Rights Disputes?
A. Pros and Cons of Mandatory Arbitration
1. Efficiency
One of the most compelling arguments justifying the mandatory
arbitration of statutory claims is arbitration's efficiency. Primarily,
advocates contend that arbitration dramatically reduces the costs
of litigation. In fact, it has been estimated that the use of arbitra-
tion in the industry has saved firms approximately two-thirds of the
cost of litigation.122 Employers also argue that arbitration is far
quicker than seeking the assistance of the already overburdened
federal courts. 123 Moreover, arbitration allows for a quicker reso-
lution "without having to provide the retainer that many plaintiff's
employment lawyers require to take on a case," thereby benefiting
the employee and the employer. 124
The efficiency of arbitration is further supported on the grounds
that "[u]nlike arbitrators who can cut to the heart of the matter,
judges are bound by vexing evidentiary and jury instruction
problems.' 25 In terms of the employer, this efficiency argument
can be extended to arbitration's lower defense costs and damage
awards. Finally, limited discovery and the informal nature of arbi-
tration reduce the time that the employer spends preparing for the
hearings and the presentation of its case.
Some critics have argued that despite the time and money that
arbitration saves, it fails to be truly "efficient" because it does not
"really reach the most efficient outcome overall" - deterring sex-
ual harassment and racial discrimination in the workplace. 126 "If
arbitration fails to adequately deter workplace discrimination, the
net result will be an inefficient allocation of human capital. 1' 27 In
other words, an extremely talented employee might be deterred
122. See Jones, supra note 3.
123. See Ganzel, supra note 14 ("Employment-related litigation has increased ex-
ponentially over the past twenty years, to the extent that everyone agrees there are
far more cases than the traditional courts can handle."). This efficiency argument is
furthered by the reality that the federal courts are already clogged with criminal cases,
namely drug case, which demand expediency, as well as complex litigation, which is
"overwhelming the remaining resources of the siting judges." Panken et al., supra
note 37, at 7.
124. Cherry, supra note 10, at 277.
125. Panken et al., supra note 37, at 7.
126. Cherry, supra note 10, at 278.
127. Id.
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from advancing solely on the grounds of race or gender." 8 In addi-
tion, praising arbitration for its cost-effectiveness ignores the real-
ity that individuals are harmed, both physically and emotionally, by
illegal discrimination in the workplace.1 29
2. Fairness
Advocates also have advanced arguments of arbitration's inher-
ent "fairness. 1 30 For instance, many contend that "arbitrators are
more reasoned, predictable decisionmakers than most jurors" pri-
marily because of the arbitrator's alleged expertise in the claim-
ant's field of employment.' 3' This "expert knowledge" possessed
by the arbitrator arguably saves the employer from having to face
the "inherent difficulty of explaining to judge or jury the business
reason for the employment action.' 32 The arbitrator's role in de-
termining awards has been viewed as enhancing the fairness of ar-
bitration because juries are unpredictable and often return awards
that are deemed unreasonable. 33 Whether there is any truth in
this notion seems irrelevant. Apparently, the mere threat that a
jury could award millions of dollars assists employment plaintiffs in
negotiating higher settlements. This argument, however, ignores
the reality that there is no real possibility of taking the claim to a
jury under mandatory arbitration contracts.
Unfairness is perhaps the most popular argument advanced by
opponents of mandatory arbitration. It is repeatedly argued that
arbitrators favor employers.1 34 This premise generally is supported
in terms of the disparate power evident in a negotiation between
an employer and an employee. 35 This imbalance is only height-
ened when the plaintiff is a woman or person of color, especially in
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 279.
131. Id.
132. Panken et al., supra note 37, at 7 (noting that employing a decisionmaker who
is also an expert benefits the employee as well).
133. See Cherry, supra note 10, at 279-80.
134. See Bucci, supra note 12.
135. See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 62-63 (noting that the behavior of the parties
exemplifies this notion, given that it is at the employer's insistence that a pre-dispute
mandatory arbitration contract is signed by the employee); Leona Green, Mandatory
Arbitration of Statutory Employment Disputes: A Public Policy Issue in Need of a
Legislative Solution, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 173 (1998).
Herein lies the problem: at the moment of hire the new employee lacks
almost all bargaining power because of the need for employment. It is the
need for employment which leads the new employee to sign the arbitration
agreement even though the employee may not wish to. More often than not,
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the securities industry where "the existence of the 'glass ceiling'
and other forms of gender discrimination continue to prevent wo-
men from attaining positions of power. '136 More specifically, "em-
pirical evidence raises a serious concern that arbitration of
employment disputes systematically favors employers. ' 137 For in-
stance, a survey of sixty-two arbitration awards in employment dis-
putes conducted by the NASD and the NYSE between 1989-1994
revealed that the average award granted in a case where the plain-
tiff prevailed on at least one claim was $125,000, compared to
$703,600 in jury verdicts during the same time period. 138 Statistics
also reveal that the median arbitration award is a mere $49,400,
compared to $264,700 in cases involving juries.139 Additionally,
with respect to arbitration within the securities industry, "surveys
have shown punitive damages awards in 0.4% to 2.1% of the
cases."140
Opponents further contend that mandatory arbitration is unfair
because it fails to provide parties with adequate due process. Not
only are written opinions explaining the bases of opinions rare, but
judicial review is extremely limited.141 In fact, even "if the arbitra-
tor has misapplied the law, the losing party is most likely out of
luck."'1 42 Under most plans, the time for filing claims for arbitra-
tion is shorter than the statute of limitations under Title VII, 1 43 pu-
nitive damages are typically prohibited and confidentiality clauses
are almost always imposed.144 Moreover, with arbitration filing
and administration fees totaling thousands of dollars per case, and
hourly rates ranging from $200-$700, arbitration can be extremely
expensive for plaintiffs, especially in more complex cases, and par-
ticularly in light of the fact that plaintiffs are almost always re-
the employee signs the contract without the ability to consult an attorney
prior to signing.
Id. at 200.
136. Cherry, supra note 10, at 299; see also Green, supra note 135, at 200-201 (not-
ing that "[b]ecause of historical patterns of discrimination, including prejudicial ste-
reotypes and unequal bargaining power, these employees who are already on unequal
footing with the employer, will have the 'civil rights rug of justice' snatched further
from beneath them").
137. Schwartz, supra note 9, at 64.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. Id. at 65.
141. See Cherry, supra note 10, at 280.
142. Id.
143. See JOHN T. DuNLOP & ARNOLD M. ZACK, PROTOCOLS FOR EMPLOYMENT
DISPUTES 84-85 (1997).
144. See id. at 88.
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quired to pay at least half of the costs. 14 5 As such, "an out-of-work
plaintiff facing a 'deep pocket' employer" may be severely
disadvantaged. 146
The plaintiff's ability to obtain a fair hearing with adequate rep-
resentation may be frustrated by the fact that attorneys generally
view arbitration as an unfavorable forum, and are thus less likely to
take on a case involving arbitration. 147 Moreover, there is a mind-
set that arbitrators give smaller awards to plaintiffs than juries. 48
In fact, in light of the fact that arbitrators typically are selected
from the industry itself, "[c]orporate defendants, with some empiri-
cal justification, may believe that they are likely to get more sym-
pathy from arbitrators, if not downright bias in their favor."'1 49
Even where the individual arbitrators are not selected from within
that particular industry, they still have "an economic stake in being
selected again, and their judgment may well be shaded by a desire
to build a 'track record' of decisions-that corporate repeat users
will view approvingly.' 50 Independent arbitration companies like-
wise have an obvious interest in being viewed favorably by
corporations. 5'
Severe restrictions imposed on discovery also have evoked an
outpouring of criticism with respect to fairness. "Limited discovery
usually works to disadvantage employment discrimination plaintiffs
because these plaintiffs bear the burden of persuasion while at the
same time are usually the party with less information.' 1 52 These
discovery limitations "deprive plaintiffs of the opportunity to make
their own choice of how much time and money to spend on the
discovery process, within the limits sanctioned by the courts.' 53
Moreover, "the ethical prohibition against lawyers' 'ex parte' con-
tacts with opposing parties (i.e., informal, and without opposing
counsel present) extends to many current, and possibly some for-
mer, employees of a corporate defendant," thereby frustrating the
plaintiff's ability to collect evidence even further. 54
145. See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 61.
146. Lepera, supra note 11, at 726.
147. See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 61.
148. See id. at 60 ("Arbitrators may be more jaded, and hence make lower awards,
particularly in more egregious cases where punitive damages are available.").
149. Id. at 61.
150. Id.
151. See id.
152. Cherry, supra note 10, at 282; see also Green, supra note 135, at 220.
153. Cherry, supra note 10, at 282.
154. Schwartz, supra note 9, at 61.
332
1999] SECURITIES MANDATORY ARBITRATION
Also, with respect to Title VII complaints, mandatory arbitration
deprives plaintiffs of the legal protections furnished by Federal
Rule of Evidence 412, which limits the admissibility of evidence of
an alleged victim's past sexual behavior in a civil lawsuit for sexual
misconduct.1 55 "This legislation, similar to state 'rape shield' laws,
was the product of feminist lobbying and is especially important
because of the sensitive nature of potentially relevant evidence in a
sexual harassment lawsuit."'15 6 Despite contentions that arbitration
is a more private forum than the courtroom, the reality that a vic-
tim of sexual harassment may not be granted the procedural pro-
tections of Rule 412 is extremely troubling. 157
The fact that the industry itself, and not an independent group,
such as the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"), oversees
mandatory arbitration has sparked yet further controversy. 58 De-
spite the contention that the various self-regulating organizations
("SROs") overseeing arbitrations have instituted procedures and
policies to temper impartiality and prejudice, there is absolutely no
assurance that the arbitrators correctly apply the law. 159 In fact,
there is absolutely no assurance that the arbitrators even will have
knowledge of the substantive law on which the claim is based. 60
This danger "that arbitrators will misapply or even ignore the law"
arises every time a statutory claim is alleged, and multiplies expo-
nentially when an employee asserts a violation of civil rights' 6 1-an
inequity only heightened by the fact that arbitrators are appointed
for their expertise in the respective field of employment. The fact
that an arbitrator may be a renowned expert in the field of securi-
ties certainly does not render him an expert in matters of racial or
sexual discrimination. It is in respect to the foregoing arguments
that critics have accused the industry of preserving "a locker-room
155. See Cherry, supra note 10, at 282-83. Federal Rule of Evidence 412(b)(2) pro-
vides: "In a civil case, evidence offered to prove the sexual behavior or sexual predis-
position of any alleged victim is admissible if it is otherwise admissible under these
rules and its probative value substantielly outweighs the danger of harm to any victim
and of unfair prejudice to any party." Id. at n.79.
156. Cherry, supra note 10, at 283.
157. See generally id.
158. See Vladeck, supra note 3, at 7; see also Davis, The Arbitration Claws, supra
note 5, at 291 (noting that self-regulatory organizations ("SROs") such as the New
York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") or National Association of Securities Dealers
("NASD") typically provide the forum for most securities arbitration).




334 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI
culture that can seem bizarrely out of step with the rest of the busi-
ness world." '162
Finally, the homogenous nature of arbitration panels within the
industry is another notable source of unfairness that has frustrated
many dissenters. 16 3 A 1994 United States General Accounting Of-
fice study revealed that 89% of the NYSE arbitrators were men
and only 11% women.164 Moreover, the report indicated that only
a very small percentage of the arbitrator pool was comprised of
people of color. 165 "Of the 349 arbitrators whose race was identifi-
able, 97% were white, .09% were black, .06% percent were Asian
and 1% were 'other.' 1 66 Accordingly, women and people of color
are unable to face a jury of their peers and are instead subjected to
"a lack of procedural protections and an arbitrator pool that is
demographically unrepresentative in terms of gender and race.' '1 67
3. Freedom of Contract
Another common ground for extolling the benefits of arbitration
is the notion of freedom of contract. Proponents advocate for en-
forcement so long as "the contract was not signed under 'duress' -
conceived of narrowly so as not to encompass economic
compulsion. "168
Critics, however, have attacked this "freedom of contract" no-
tion on the grounds that mandatory arbitration is nothing more
than a contract of adhesion. 169 They contend that "all contracting
takes place within a set of background legal norms and assump-
tions.' 170 Coinciding with this background is the notion that cer-
tain "mandatory terms" exist which cannot be waived under any
circumstances, even if the parties agree.' 7' In other words, with
mandatory arbitration, there is no freedom to shop for terms or
room to bargain. This is especially true in the securities industry,
where the practice is industry-wide. The problem is heightened by
the fact that there is an imbalance of power between the employee
and employer. Moreover, "when one views an arbitration clause as
162. Id.
163. See generally Cherry, supra note 10, at 281, 299.
164. See id. at 281.
165. See id.
166. Id. at 299.
167. Id. at 269.
168. Id. at 278.
169. See id.; see also Schwartz, supra note 9, at 114.
170. Cherry, supra note 10, at 278.
171. Id.
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the waiver of the most important right of access to the courts," the
mandatory nature of arbitration contracts becomes an even greater
injustice.172
4. Maintaining Relations
Because of arbitration's tendency to be less adversarial, it also
has been praised for more readily allowing the employment rela-
tionship to continue after the resolution of the dispute. 173 Support-
ers of arbitration note that the emotional nature of most
employment disputes can be controlled and contained more easily
given that parties are extended the opportunity to express them-
selves before a neutral party "trained to move the parties from ex-
pressing anger to problem-solving and engagement in molding a
satisfactory resolution."174 The private and confidential nature of
arbitration likewise lends itself to the maintenance of employment
relations; for "most employees want to protect their reputations
and careers, while employers are concerned about business reper-
cussions, workplace disruptions and precedent setting awards trig-
gering 'me too' claims. 175
Confidentiality, however, is not without its faults. In silencing
the contents of the arbitration, public scrutiny of company prac-
tices is likewise stifled. Without fear of criticism from the media,
or sanctions from a court of law, companies have little incentive to
implement systems to curtail the source of the disputes. Conse-
quently, in many companies, sexual and racial harassment and dis-
crimination will continue unchecked.
B. Discrepancy Since Gilmer
Confusion remains as to whether Gilmer should apply to the
mandatory arbitration of statutory claims, especially in light of the
fact that Gilmer did not expressly or impliedly overrule Gardner-
Denver.176 The Ninth Circuit, in particular, has made headlines in
172. Id.; see also Schwartz, supra note 9, at 114 (noting that the take-it-or-leave-it
nature of mandatory arbitration clauses undermines the argument of employers and
courts that arbitration is a matter of consent).
173. See Lepera, supra note 11, at 725 (noting that this may be especially true in
situations where an employee is seeking accommodation under the ADA).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 725-26.
176. Compare Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998)
(finding the securities exchange registration mandating arbitration of. statutory claims
to be unenforceable in the context of a Title VII claim on the grounds that it violated
the Civil Rights Act of 1991) with Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 146 F.3d 175 (3rd
Cir. 1998) (finding that an employee's statutory claims can be subject to mandatory
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narrowing the scope of Gilmer.177 For instance, in Prudential Ins.
Co. v. Lai,178 the court refused to enforce the same type of arbitra-
tion provisions approved by the Supreme Court in Gilmer on the
grounds that the plaintiff did not "knowingly" waive her right to
bring a civil action over sexual harassment and discrimination.1 7 9
The court reasoned that "Congress intended there to be at least a
knowing agreement to arbitrate employment disputes before an
employee may be deemed to have waived the comprehensive statu-
tory rights, remedies and procedural protections prescribed in Title
VII and related statutes," citing support in the text and legislative
history of Title VII, as well as the enactment of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991.180 The court stressed that in the context of sexual har-
assment claims, the procedural protections contemplated by the
legislature "may be particularly significant." '181 Accordingly, the
court concluded that "a Title VII plaintiff may only be forced to
forego her statutory remedies and arbitrate her claims if she has
knowingly agreed to submit such disputes to arbitration. 182
The Ninth Circuit extended the Lai holding in Nelson v. Cyprus
Bagdad Copper Corp.,183 finding that the employee did not enter
into a "knowing agreement" to arbitrate his ADA claims. 84 In
Nelson, the Court noted that the form signed by the employee, ac-
knowledging the receipt of a revised employee handbook, did not
suffice as a waiver under Lai.185 Not only did the acknowledge-
ment fail to notify Nelson of the arbitration clause, it also failed to
inform him that his acceptance of the handbook constituted a
waiver of his right to a judicial forum.186 Moreover, the fact that
Nelson continued employment subsequent to receiving the hand-
book, and after supposedly having read its contents, likewise fell
short of a "knowing" waiver under Lai.187 Despite such decisions,
arbitration, provided that principles of fairness, voluntariness and due process are not
violated).
177. See infra notes 178-193, 206-207 and accompanying text.
178. 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 812 (1995).
179. Id. at 1305.
180. Id. at 1304.
181. Id. at 1305.
182. Id. ("In this case, even assuming that appellants were aware of the nature of
the U-4 form, they could not have understood that in signing it, they were agreeing to
arbitrate sexual discrimination suits. The U-4 form did not purport to describe the
types of disputes that were to be subject to arbitration.").
183. 119 F.3d 756 (1997).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 761.
186. See id.
187. See id. at 762.
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Lai nevertheless remains a limited holding in so far as it concerns a
1881
"knowing" waiver.
The Ninth Circuit specifically examined the legality of the securi-
ties industry's licensing agreement in Duffield v. Robertson Ste-
phens & Co.,1189 and ultimately found it to be in violation of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991.190 The three judge panel held that plain-
tiff could not be denied her right to pursue her claim in court under
Title VII by virtue of having signed a U-4, stating that Form U-4
compels precisely what Congress intended to prohibit in the 1991
Act - mandatory requirements under which prospective employ-
ees agree as a condition of employment to surrender their rights to
litigate future Title VII claims in a judicial forum and accept arbi-
tration instead.1 9' The court grounded support for this contention
in the context, language and legislative history of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991.192 In addition, the court noted that the "take-it-or-
leave-it" nature of the U-4 form is "fundamentally at odds with a
provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Section 118, that was
intended to help deter employment discrimination by increasing
claimants' choice of fora.' '1 93
Any hope, however, that Duffield would bring an end to the en-
forcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the securities
industry was misplaced. In fact, exactly one month later, the Third
Circuit directly opposed the Duffield holding in the case of Seus v.
John Nuveen & Co., Inc.'94 The Seus court found that employees'
statutory claims can be subject to arbitration as a condition of em-
ployment, except where "fraud, duress, mistake or some other
188. See, e.g., Seus, 146 F.3d at 183-84 & n.2. (rejecting any type of heightened
standard); Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 838 (8th Cir. 1997)
(same).
189. 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998).
190. See id. at 1192 (noting that the underlying purpose of the 1991 Civil Rights Act
was to "expand employees' rights and 'to increase the possible remedies available to
civil rights plaintiffs"' (quoting Lai, 42 F.3d at 1304)).
191. See id. at 1199.
192. See id.
193. Id.
194. 146 F.3d 175 (3rd Cir. 1998) (finding that the arbitration agreement which had
been signed by the employee as part of the U-4 Form was valid and enforceable under
the FAA). The court agreed with the majority of other courts "that the Form U-4
compliance clause obligates a registrant to comply with the NASD Arbitration Code
as it existed at the time she filed suit." Id. at 187 (noting that Seus "clearly bound
herself to comply with amendments to the NASD's rules, including those governing
arbitration").
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ground recognized by the law applicable to contracts" 195 is present.
More recently, the Fourth Circuit ruled that an applicant who signs
an arbitration agreement as part of an application process is re-
quired to arbitrate his race discrimination claim.196 A number of
other circuit courts similarly have found pre-dispute agreements to
arbitrate Title VII claims permissible under Gilmer.197
Meanwhile, a Massachusetts district court's decision in Rosen-
berg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,198 which had
found the mandatory arbitration of Title VII claims unenforceable
four months prior to Duffield,199 was recently overruled by the
First Circuit.2°° The First Circuit held that "neither the language of
the statute nor the legislative history demonstrates an intent in the
1991 CRA to preclude pre-dispute arbitration agreements."
20 1
Moreover, the court found the NYSE arbitration procedures suffi-
ciently adequate to resolve Rosenberg's Title VII claims.20 2 Never-
theless, despite expressly rejecting the district court's reasoning,
195. Id. at 184 (noting that "[u]nequal bargaining power is not alone enough to
make an agreement to arbitrate a contract of adhesion," and even if a contract of
adhesion arguably could be proven, it would still only be rendered invalid "where its
terms unreasonably favor the other party").
196. See Johnson v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 148 F.3d 373 (4th Cir. 1998).
197. See, e.g., Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir.
1991); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 308, 312 (6th Cir. 1991);
Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126, 1130 (7th Cir. 1997);
Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 837 (8th Cir. 1997); Cole v. Burns
Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1467-68 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
198. 995 F. Supp. 190 (D. Mass. 1998).
199. See id. The district court found Gilmer inapplicable to Rosenberg's Title VII
claim, on the grounds that Gilmer, which was decided under the ADEA, did not con-
sider Title VII's text, legislative history or purpose. See id. at 200. The district court
further distinguished Gilmer on the grounds that the system employed by the NYSE,
and at issue in the case, was inadequate to protect Susan Rosenberg's rights. See id. at
206. Citing to possible structural bias in the NYSE's arbitration system, the district
court concluded that the former Merrill Lynch employee could have her harassment
case heard in court. See id. at 207-209.
Specifically, the district court noted that plaintiff signed the standard U-4 Form,
subjecting her to mandatory arbitration of all claims in accordance with the rules of
the NYSE and other SROs; however, "[n]o one pointed out to her that she was in fact
agreeing to arbitrate all future disputes with her employer, including discrimination
claims, should they arise." Id. at 193. Moreover, the district court reasoned that
while Gilmer upheld the enforceability of U-4 mandatory arbitration contracts with
respect to age discrimination claims, the Supreme Court "left open the possibility of
evaluating the adequacy of the arbitral forum in specific cases [including those where
an ADEA claim is brought]." Id. at 206.
200. Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 98-1246, 1998
WL 880910, at *1 (1st Cir. Dec. 22, 1998).
201. 1998 WL 880910, at *8.
202. See id. at *14-15.
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the Rosenberg court concluded that the arbitration agreement was
unenforceable. 0 3 The Court explained that "compelling arbitra-
tion would not be 'appropriate' under the 1991 CRA" in light of
the arbitration agreement's failure "to define the range of claims
subject to arbitration. 2 0 4
The Ninth Circuit is presently the only Circuit Court of Appeals
to hold that pre-dispute arbitration agreements are prohibited by
Title VII, as amended by the 1991 Civil Rights Act.20 5 The Circuit
will most likely continue to stand its ground, however, especially in
light of its most recent ruling in Craft v. Campbell Soup Co.216 that
the FAA does not apply to labor or employment contracts. The
Craft court cited support for this bold premise in the wording of
Section 2, the legislative history of the FAA, the pre-New Deal
understanding of the Commerce Clause, and the implications of a
number of Supreme Court cases, including Gilmer.20 7 Given that
the FAA has long been interpreted as being the most persuasive
legal support for mandatory arbitration, the Ninth Circuit's holding
can be viewed as a giant step backwards for alternative dispute res-
olution ("ADR") proponents.
Although the Ninth Circuit stands alone, there is no doubt that
uncertainty still exists in the wake of Gilmer. As such, all circuits
undoubtedly anticipated a definitive decision from the Supreme
Court this term. The Court's recent denial of certiorari in the Duf-
field case,20 8 however, will only perpetuate the inconsistency, con-
tradiction and debate which has reigned since Gilmer. Accord-
ingly, a broker in the New York branch of PaineWebber will con-
tinue to fall prey to the mandatory arbitration of sexual harassment
and discrimination claims, while a broker in the firm's San Fran-
cisco office, in the very same position, will have the option of tak-
ing her claim to court.
203. See id. at *21.
204. Id. at *19, *21 (noting that "some minimal level of notice to the employee that
statutory claims are subject to arbitration" is required).
205. See Michael Delikat & Rene Kathawala, Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements
Survive Yet Another Challenge, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 21, 1999, at 1.
206. 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 30580, *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 2, 1998).
207. 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 30580, at *22.
208. See generally Rims Expands Membership to Industry Professionals, Bus. INS.,
Nov. 16, 1998, at 1.
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III. The Inability of Mandatory Arbitration to Protect
Civil Rights Plaintiffs
The numerous advantages of arbitration make its mandatory na-
ture highly attractive to corporate employers. However, the ineq-
uities grossly outweigh any benefits derived. Arbitration's
informality creates a type of "second-class" justice, with little re-
gard for the rules of evidence and little room for discovery. This
notion is only bolstered by the reality that arbitrators are not re-
quired to correctly apply the law. Moreover, confidentiality agree-
ments and the lack of written opinions prevent public monitoring
of arbitration decisions, removing a critical check on impartiality
and bias. In addition, the fact that contracts are entered into with-
out equal knowledge and bargaining power, coupled with the fact
that arbitrators statistically favor employers, creates an inherent
imbalance of power. Finally, the homogenous nature of arbitration
panels stands in sharp contrast to the composition of those assert-
ing the claims.
A. Congressional Intent & Legislative History
Mandatory arbitration also fails to comport with the purpose and
history of the 1991 Civil Rights Act ("1991 CRA"). Most obvi-
ously, the plain meaning of Section 118 of the 1991 CRA does not
support the notion of mandatory arbitration. Section 118 merely
"encourages" the use of arbitration "[w]here appropriate and to
the extent authorized by law. ' 20 9 This latter limitation is critical to
the interpretation of congressional intent. While there is no doubt
that Congress recognized the efficiency of arbitration and en-
couraged its use, it clearly supported arbitration only in circum-
stances where it would be both appropriate and legally permissible
to do so. The mandatory nature of arbitration in an undesirable
forum does not fall under such a definition. Furthermore, in listing
the various forms of ADR, including "settlement negotiations, con-
ciliation, facilitation, mediation, fact-finding, minitrials, and arbi-
tration," the words "mandatory" or "pre-dispute" are never
used.21° In fact, all of the forms of ADR listed prior to arbitration
"are voluntary and do not prospectively bar either party from ac-
cess to a jury trial. '21 1
209. Cherry, supra note 10, at 287 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.).
210. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081 (1991)).
211. Id. at 287-88.
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A closer look at other portions of the text reveals that Congress
did not intend to support pre-dispute contracts in enacting the 1991
CRA, especially in light of the sections providing for jury trials and
punitive damages.212 It would seem "inconsistent for Congress to
pass a bill to strengthen the rights available to employment dis-
crimination plaintiffs and then, in the very same bill, contrive to
deny these plaintiffs redress in court for employment discrimina-
tion claims. 213
Congressional intent to preclude mandatory arbitration under
Title VII is likewise evinced by the 1991 CRA's legislative history.
"The legislative history of § 118 unambiguously confirms that Con-
gress sought to codify the law as it stood at the time the section was
drafted, and eliminates any possibility that Congress intended to
write Gilmer into Title VII law or leave the question of which
forms of arbitration were permissible to the whims and presump-
tions of future court decisions. 2 14 Moreover, the legislative his-
tory of the ADA and the Civil Rights Act of 1990 ("1990 CRA"),
each passed one year earlier, support precluding mandatory arbi-
tration in the context of Title VII.21 5 For instance, during the adop-
tion of the ADA, the House Judiciary Report stated:
This amendment was adopted to encourage alternative means
of dispute resolution that are already authorized by law. The
Committee wishes to emphasize, however, that the use of alter-
native dispute resolution mechanisms is intended to supplement,
not supplant, the remedies provided by this Act. Thus, for ex-
ample, the Committee believes that any agreement to submit
disputed issues to arbitration, whether in the context of a CBA
or in an employment contract, does not preclude the affected
person from seeking relief under the enforcement provisions of
this Act. 16
The 1990 CRA's language concerning arbitration was derived from
the ADA, and the statements responding to and interpreting the
legislation mirrored each other.2 17 Despite the fact that the 1990
CRA was ultimately vetoed, its language pertaining to ADR was
212. See id. at 287.
213. Id.
214. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1195.
215. See Cherry, supra note 10, at 288.
216. Id. at 288-89 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 76 (1990)) (emphasis
added).
217. See 42 U.S.C. § 12212. The section provides: "where appropriate and to the
extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including
settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, fact-finding, minitrials,
and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under this chapter." Id.
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incorporated into the 1991 Act,218 thereby reflecting the mentality
that while arbitration was to be encouraged, its application should
be knowing and voluntary. This interpretation is borne out in the
remarks made by President Bush upon signing the 1991 CRA:
Section 118 of the Act encourages voluntary agreements be-
tween employers and employees to rely on alternative mecha-
nisms such as mediation and arbitration. This provision is
among the most valuable in the Act because of the important
contribution that voluntary private arrangements can make in
the effort to conserve the scarce resources of the Federal judici-
ary for those matters as to which no alternative forum would be
appropriate. 19
President Bush's reiteration of the word "voluntary" certainly re-
buts the notion that arbitration should be mandatory or a condition
of employment.
Finally, the ideals that motivated enactment of the 1991 CRA
are undermined by the notion of mandatory arbitration. For in-
stance, Congress enacted'the 1991 CRA to increase the procedural
rights and remedies afforded to Title VII plaintiffs. "The Supreme
Court has long recognized that in enacting Title VII Congress envi-
sioned that decisions and remedies from the federal courts would
play a unique and indispensable role in advancing the social policy
of deterring workplace discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and
origin. '220 In placing the ultimate responsibility for enforcing Title
VII with the federal courts, the Court was implicitly stating that
such claims should not be deferred to arbitration. It therefore
would be rather disingenuous to conclude that Congress supported
mandatory arbitration irrespective of the rights provided by both
the 1991 CRA and Title VII.
B. Women and Minorities Are Disadvantaged by
Mandatory Arbitration
ADR, in its abstract form, would seem to be a welcoming option
for disgruntled women in the workplace, especially in fields tradi-
tionally dominated by men. For example, consider a mid-level fe-
male employee in a large Manhattan brokerage house whose boss
hangs photos of swimsuit models all over his office. Because she
218. See Cherry, supra note 10, at 288.
219. Id. at 290 (quoting Pub. L. No. 102-166, Civil Rights Act of 1991, 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 768 (emphasis added)).
220. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1187 (citing McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing
Co., 513 U.S. 353, 358 (1995)).
1999] SECURITIES MANDATORY ARBITRATION 343
routinely works within the confines of his office, these photos quite
naturally make her uncomfortable. Nevertheless, she appreciates
the work opportunities that this particular senior-level manager of-
fers and is fully aware of his power to promote her. Moreover,
because the industry is dominated by men and her position is easily
dispensable, she believes that going to his boss would be out of the
question. As such, she resolves to endure the posters, until this
subtle type of harassment elevates into obnoxious asides and pats
on her behind. Ultimately, she concludes that a lawsuit is the only
option, but one that will cost a great deal of money and perhaps
even her job.
It is with respect to situations such as the foregoing that advo-
cates of arbitration extol its virtues. Not only would arbitration
have allowed the employee to resolve her dispute in complete con-
fidentiality, but she also could have terminated the harassment at a
far earlier stage. Perhaps even a single phone call to the person in
charge of company arbitration may have been enough.
Praising arbitration for its confidentiality and swiftness, however,
ignores the reality that public scrutiny is sometimes essential. Even
if the above scenario could have been resolved by way of arbitra-
tion, the inappropriateness of her boss' behavior would have been
silenced by the confidential nature of the arbitration. And, with
other women in the firm and industry ignorant of such practices,
the firm has little incentive to make changes. In this respect, the
securities industry, more than any other, insulates defendants from
responsibility. The potential for such behavior to continue un-
checked is more than enough to warrant concern, but when cou-
pled with the grave risk that arbitrators will grossly favor the
employer, the inequity of mandatory arbitration is obvious. The
reality of this problem is only further heightened by the fact that
fewer than 15% of brokers are women. With arbitration panels
remaining representative of this disparity, women are placed at a
disadvantage from the outset.
Not long ago, the Wall Street Journal conducted a report on sev-
eral cases of blatant sexual harassment in the securities industry.221
Every single case analyzed was one of obvious liability; however,
despite such clear-cut facts, the awards were minimal at best. In
fact, the report noted that one women who had prevailed in a sex-
ual harassment arbitration against a securities firm recovered only
$300.212 The article reported: "So grim are the prospects for most
221. See Vladeck, supra note 3 (citing WALL ST. J., June 9, 1994, at Al).
222. See id.
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women who go through the securities-industry arbitration process
that lawyers say they now often advise their client not to bother
with arbitration at all. Instead, they urge women to take modest
settlements and walk away. "223
Given the reality that the primary targets and victims of sexual
harassment and discrimination in the workplace are women,z24 the
foregoing study is especially disturbing. Of equal concern is the
fact that most discrimination and harassment plaintiffs are people
of color, "reflecting historical racial patterns and hierarchies. 2 5
In fact, according to a survey of the percentages of people bringing
racial discrimination claims to the EEOC in 1996, 84% were black,
9% were white, 2% were Asian, 1% were American Indian and
3% were other.22 6 In light of such statistics, women of color are
especially disadvantaged by mandatory arbitration in the work-
place; for they are forced to face discrimination based on both sex
and race.227 Consequently, the likelihood that a woman of color
will find herself in front of an arbitrator rather than a representa-
tive jury is high.228 "Thus, women, and especially women of color,
who are working in 'nontraditional' industries formerly dominated
by men will find yet another potential roadblock to equality in the
workplace. "229
The reality that arbitrators do not represent the parties that most
often come before them is not the only drawback to arbitration for
women. Arbitration also gives securities firms little incentive to
take action against the sexual harassment and discrimination that
permeates the industry. According to feminists, mandatory arbi-
tration in the face of growing numbers of discrimination claims can
be interpreted as "an attempt by employers to reduce their liability
for gender and race discrimination without correspondingly reduc-
ing the amount of discrimination in their workplace.21 3 ° In other
words, because employers know that court is never a possibility,
mandatory arbitration permits them to tactfully avoid taking any
active steps to temper the inequities and discrimination that so ob-
223. Id.
224. Cherry, supra note 10, at 299 (noting that women simply are generally not
"socialized to harass men, let alone be sexually assertive").
225. Id.
226. See id. (citing EEOC National Database, EEOC and FEPA Receipts, FY 90-
96) (original data on file with the Harvard Women's Law Journal).
227. Id. at 300.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. Id. at 268.
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viously exist. This argument is especially credible given the reality
that punitive damages are so rarely, if ever, awarded in arbitration
forums. It is in this respect that mandatory arbitration contracts
blatantly undermine Title VII.
D. Proposed Reforms
With the Supreme Court remaining curiously silent on
mandatory arbitration, firms may continue to employ mandatory
arbitration employment contracts as they see fit. However, with
the NASD and NYSE refusing to honor all contracts of mandatory
arbitration with respect to sexual discrimination and harassment
claims, firms must prepare for the changes that inevitably lie
ahead. First and foremost, employers should establish written poli-
cies regarding sexual harassment and racial discrimination, using
the EEOC guidelines as a model. Procedures should be imple-
mented within each department to control the degree of sexual
harassment and discrimination in the workplace. These procedures
should include, at a minimum, training sessions for all employees
and internal mechanisms that can resolve disputes as they arise.
Even in the face of the movement toward a voluntary system,
employers will continue'to enjoy the benefits of arbitration. Arbi-
tration resolves disputes quickly, cheaply and confidentially and
will therefore remain a popular choice for many employees. As
such, it is crucial that arbitrations are conducted in a manner that
ensures due process.
An arbitration system that benefits both employers and employ-
ees is not beyond reach. Such a system could take many shapes.
For example, using non-industry panels in harassment and discrimi-
nation cases would not only boost the validity and accuracy of the
rulings, but also alleviate many of the employee's concerns. Pro-
viding panels composed of a greater percentage of minorities and
women would achieve similar results. The establishment of higher
standards and qualifications for arbitrators would better control
the risk of bias and disregard for the law. In addition, an educa-
tional system that would keep arbitrators apprised of the substan-
tive law on which statutory claims are based should be developed.
Finally, a review of all awards for errors of law, as well as a require-
ment that all decisions be written and made public, will enhance
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the ability to monitor and oversee arbitrators and provide a crucial
check on impartiality.231
It is important to add, however, that none of these changes are
required in a voluntary system. Allowing employees the option of
taking their claims to court will provide employers with an incen-
tive to find the best mixture of efficiency and fairness. In a volun-
tary system, the employer will be competing against the federal
courts as well as other employers for the best system of dispute
resolution. This free competition will lead to a resolution system
that is both fair and efficient, as opposed to the current system of
second-class justice.
Conclusion
The overall efficiency of arbitration is irrefutable. In fact, studies
reveal that ADR techniques such as arbitration and mediation are
now being used routinely and with a significant degree of success in
the resolution of various disputes. This trend is not at all surprising
given the statistics - employers win more and pay less. However,
swift justice is not always fair. The time and money that arbitration
saves employers comes at a very high cost to the employee. Legal
fees cannot be reduced without lower damages and higher thresh-
old costs to plaintiffs. Quicker resolutions are dependent upon lim-
itations on evidence and discovery. Privacy goes hand in hand with
a lack of public scrutiny.
Arbitration certainly has benefits, but those benefits are under-
mined when the procedure becomes one of force rather than
choice. There is absolutely no correlation between the claimed
benefits of arbitration and the mandatory nature of arbitration
within the industry. The two issues simply are not related. Giving
people a choice, especially with respect to civil rights complaints
would be the best way to ensure fairness, and, at the same time,
preserve the integrity of the court; for to allow mandatory arbitra-
tion contracts to continue unchecked ultimately could render the
courts' ability to enforce anti-discrimination laws moot. In light of
its efficiency, arbitration is sure to remain an advantageous option
for employers whether it is voluntary or mandatory. Accordingly,
eliminating mandatory arbitration clauses is the logical and essen-
tial first step in achieving the best dispute resolution system for all
parties involved.
231. Davis, A Model for Arbitration, supra note 11, at 188 ("By reviewing awards
for errors of law, the courts would meet party expectation and preserve guaranteed
rights.").
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